Do incumbent cable TV firms act to deter entry by cities? I use variation in the costs for a city to enter and operate in local cable TV markets to show that incumbent cable TV firms use system upgrades to deter entry by cities. Interestingly, incumbent cable TV firms do not use system upgrades to deter entry by private firms. My research demonstrates that private incumbents actively engage in behavior designed to deter potential entry by public agencies. This contribution links two important bodies of literature: privatization and entry deterrence. This result also suggests that threat of entry may be a mechanism that a public agency can use to control incumbent firm behavior.
Introduction
There has been much theoretical literature on entry deterrence, but comparatively few empirical demonstrations of entry deterring behavior. Empirical demonstrations of entry deterrence have focused on the interactions between firms. There has been no theoretical or empirical research that considers whether a private incumbent would respond differently to potential entry by a public agency. The gap in the literature is surprising given the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on privatization. Privatization of state owned enterprises increases competitive pressures in the market 1 and we should expect incumbent firms to respond in ways to deter such competition. Taken a step further, we should also expect incumbent firms to deter entry by state-owned enterprises and public agencies in the first place. This paper provides empirical results demonstrating that private incumbent firms act to deter entry by public agencies.
Furthermore, this paper shows that the incumbent firm response to potential entry by a public agency is greater than the response to potential entry by a private firm.
The context of this study is the US cable TV industry. The US cable TV industry is comprised of multiple, geographically separate, city-specific, systems. These characteristics allow for precise identification of the incumbent and its response to potential entrants. From a public policy point of view, the size of the industry (around $100B in US revenues annually) and its rapidly changing strategic landscape make it important for study. Convergence in product offerings between telecommunications and cable TV companies has brought increased scrutiny to the role of cities. Traditionally, cable TV firms have had to negotiate franchise agreements on a case by case basis with 1 See Megginson and Netter (2001) for an extensive review of the privatization literature.
local government agencies. Telecommunications firms are now faced with that same prospect, and have made some effort to move franchising authority away from the local level to the state or national level. 2 Understanding the role of cities and other local franchising authorities is an important step in understanding the strategic landscape in which telecommunications and cable TV companies may operate in the future.
My research uses a dataset of over 4000 cable TV systems over seven years. Data on each cable TV system has been matched with local market information that includes information on the presence of actual and potential competitors. I first investigate incumbent deterrence of public entrants by focusing on how the timing of system upgrades by an incumbent cable TV firm relates to the city's cost of entering and operating in the local market. I use variations in costs within and across cities over time to identify potential entry by public agencies. One source of variation is the presence of municipal electric utilities in some cities. The existing municipal utility infrastructure results in lower entry and operating costs. Another source of variation is the presence of laws restricting the city's ability to enter and operate cable and telecommunications services. The presence of these laws results in higher costs of entry for the city. I find that incumbent firms upgrade their systems 11% to 23% faster when the city has a municipal utility. This result is statistically significant and robust to a number of specifications controlling for alternative explanations. In particular, once a state passes a law restricting municipal entry then incumbents no longer treat cities with municipal utilities any different from other cities. In a second step, I investigate the extent to which incumbents use system upgrades to deter private entrants. My results suggest that 2 Cite recent FCC rulemaking.
incumbent firms do not use upgrades to deter entry. However, there is some indication that incumbents may be able to rely on reputation and multi-market contact to deter private entrants. Multi-market contact is important in other industries (Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000) , and so one goal of future work is to test the extent to which incumbents may rely on forms of entry deterrence other than system upgrades.
In summary, this research makes three important contributions. First, it adds to the small but important body of work on empirical demonstrations of entry deterrence. Second, it suggests that technology upgrades may be an effective mechanism used by incumbents to deter entry. This contribution may be of particular interest to researchers focusing on technology and innovation. Finally, my research demonstrates that private incumbents actively engage in behavior designed to deter potential entry by public agencies.
Theoretical Background and Related Literature
There has been a large amount of theoretical work on the use of preemptive investment in capacity or capital to deter entry (see Wilson (1992) for an overview). The standard preemption model follows a Stackelberg framework whereby an incumbent in the first period adjusts capacity in anticipation of an entrant's behavior in the second period. In certain cases the incumbent can adjust capacity in such a way to entirely foreclose future entry. Standard preemption models assume capital (and hence capacity) is durable.
Eaton and Lipsey (1980) relax this assumption and allow capital to depreciate. They show that when capital has a finite life, the incumbent needs to renew capital early (i.e.:
before it has fully depreciated) in order to avoid preemptive investment by an entrant.
Such a model seems well suited for industries characterized by non-trivial technological change such as the cable TV industry where capital may be non-durable or technological improvements require periodic upgrades. In such an industry, an incumbent will signal to potential entrants that it will stay in the market long enough such that their entry will be unprofitable. In order to commit to being in the market "long enough", the incumbent will invest in new capital before the old capital has fully depreciated.
There have been comparatively fewer empirical demonstrations of entry deterrence. No doubt the difficulty of identifying potential as opposed to actual entrants has contributed to the paucity of research in this area. Empirical results have been mixed: there is little empirical support for the idea that capacity deters entry. For example, Lieberman (1987) and Masson and Shaanan (1986) find little empirical support of incumbent use of excess capacity as a way to deter entry. There is more support for the idea that incumbents use limit pricing as a strategy to deter entry. Goolsbee and Syverson (2005) show incumbent airlines use limit pricing strategies to deter Southwest Airlines from entering certain citypair markets. Simon (2005) finds that newer incumbents in the magazine industry cut prices in response to entry more aggressively than older incumbents. Price and capacity need not be the only means of deterring entry. Dafny (2005) links procedure volume to the deterrent effects of learning-by-doing in the hospital surgical procedure market.
Rajshree, Ganco and Ziedonis (2007) suggest that semiconductor firms may use patent litigation as a way to create a reputation for "toughness" that dissuades employees from leaving to found start ups. I have found no studies on entry deterrence that consider an incumbent firm's response to potential entry by a public agency.
Empirical work on privatization shows that state owned enterprises and other public agencies experience large productivity gains upon privatization. Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an excellent overview of this literature. Few studies have considered the effect of privatization on existing firms in the market. Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) find that private competitors suffered large drops in market capitalization upon privatization of British Airways. Laurin and Bozec (2001) show that the productivity of Canadian National, a recently privatized railway, surpassed the productivity of the Canadian Pacific, a private railway firm. Theoretically, these empirical studies are related to the study of mixed duopolies in which competitors have different objective functions. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) provide a theoretical model of a mixed duopoly competition between two software firms with different objective functions. Among their many interesting results, they find that when the incumbent firm attempts to maximize profits and the potential entrant attempts to maximize revenue (by setting prices at marginal cost) the response of the incumbent will increase in aggressiveness as the discount rate of the installed capital increases. In other words, the faster the barrier to entry erodes, the more quickly will the incumbent respond to potential entry. There is a direct correlation to cable TV industry: as the value of the current system depreciates (due to technological advances), the more likely it will be that the incumbent responds to a potential entrant by upgrading the system.
The relationship between an incumbent cable TV system and the city in which it operates has been studied in prior empirical research. In his case study of cable TV in Oakland,
California, Oliver Williamson (1976) described how the relationship between the city and firm evolved over time from one characterized by competition between potential franchisors bidding to serve the city to one characterized by opportunism on the part of the firm after the franchise was awarded. Several researchers have subsequently suggested that there exist mechanisms to help the city constrain opportunism on the part of the firm. For example, Prager (1990) Sappington and Spiller (1987) ), and public provision (Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1989) . In a study closely related to mine, Savage and Wirth (2005) study the effect of potential entry by private firms on incumbent cable TV operators. They find that the potential entrants have no effect on incumbent prices, but they may have an effect on the number of channels offered by the incumbent.
3 Institutional Background and Hypotheses
Industry description
The contractual relationship between the city and the cable firm is governed by a franchise agreement which typically runs 10-15 years in length. cursor to broadband over cable, video on demand, digital video recording, and telephony.
Costs for upgrading a system vary by geographic and system characteristics; the average cost to upgrade is about $1500 per customer and can take six to 24 months to complete (Goolsbee, 2006 system. Local governments may be able to use tax-free financing in the form of municipal bonds to build out cable TV networks. Emmons and Prager (1997) show that municipal cable TV systems are able to set prices below those of private operators in similar cities, and suggest that cheap financing may be one reason cities are able to do this. Sappington and Sidak (2003) suggest that public enterprises may be more likely to maximize revenue instead of profit, and hence public enterprises will offer lower prices than private firms. 8 The forgoing suggests two main reasons private firms may be particularly concerned about public entry and provision. Public providers may be low cost (relative to other potential entrants) or they may pursue different objectives than private firms. Either of these conditions may result in lower prices and hence less profitability for the incumbent private firm. ; the more the manager deviates from profit maximization, the more prices will drop.
Communications. SEPB has alleged that Charter engaged in predatory pricing to drive SEPB out of the market.
In many cases cities need voter or state approval before offering their own telecommunications system and the presence of laws regarding these legal requirements add to the fixed cost of setting up a system. A number of states have proposed and passed legislation that limits a city's ability to provide its own cable TV service (see Table 1 for detail on which states have such laws). These types of laws first came into existence in 1996 when the state of Missouri passed a law prohibiting municipalities from offering telecom services and gained wide acceptance with a US Supreme Court decision in March 2004.
9 After such a law is passed, cities with municipal utilities may no longer have a low cost advantage; while in some cases they may still be able to use the municipal utility infrastructure, they may need to incur additional costs to satisfy state legislation. In extreme cases, the city may even be explicitly prohibited from entry (such is the case in Nebraska and Texas, for example).
Private Entrants
In most cities, there exists one incumbent cable TV provider. However, in the late 1990s, 
Generation of Hypotheses
Empirically we observe that cities have entered cable TV markets. Researchers have suggested that cities may be able to provide cable TV at a lower cost than private companies because of access to tax free financing and to learning-by-doing effects associated with owning and operating a municipal utility and/or a municipal i-Net.
Statements in annual reports further support the idea that incumbent cable TV companies view cities as competitive threats. However, there exists variation in terms of a city's costs to build a cable TV system. Some states have passed laws that restrict and in some cases prohibit a city from building and operating its own cable TV system. Cities in these states face higher fixed costs associated with entry. Once built, there also exists variation in terms of a city's costs to operate a cable TV system. Cities that have a municipal utility should be able to operate at lower costs than cities that do not, and because of learning-by-doing this effect should be amplified when the municipal utility has an i-Net or other similar communications service.
Theoretical research suggests that one way an incumbent can deter a competitor's entry is by renewing capital quicker. In the cable TV industry, the largest capital outlays over the past decade have been to upgrade systems from one way to two way capability. To the extent that incumbent cable TV firms want to deter entry by a city, upgrade will occur faster in those cities that have a lower fixed cost of entry or a lower marginal cost of production. These ideas are formally stated in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Incumbent cable TV firms upgrade systems faster in the presence of a municipal utility.
Incumbent firms also face entry by private providers. We expect that they will also use system upgrades to deter entry by private providers. technologically advanced systems may be among the first to be upgraded and hence it is important to control for these effects. While I do not observe when the system was last upgraded, I expect the year the system was built to be highly correlated with its prior upgrade schedule. In my specifications, I use Year System Built to create indicator variables for the decade in which the system was built. These indicator variables allow for a flexible econometric specification (described in more detail below). I expect that more recently built systems will be upgraded slower; the capital invested in these systems
will not yet have fully depreciated and some of these systems may already incorporate features that would be included in an upgrade. While larger systems take longer to upgrade, they may be upgraded before smaller systems if larger systems are more profitable. For example, upgraded larger systems may attract higher paying advertisers, and so upgrading these systems may be a priority. Homes passed, a count of the number of homes that the incumbent cable system passes, is included to account for system size.
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I also include the number of systems owned by the firm to control for firm size (as distinct from system size). Larger firms may have access to more resources such as bank loans or 11 Information on two way capability is missing for some years and so I use interpolated values for those years. For all specifications described below, I also include a dummy variable for those observations that had missing two-way capable values to control for any bias caused by non- Municipal utility indicates if a system is in a city that has a municipal utility provider.
There are no changes in municipal utility status over the relevant time frame (most municipal utilities were established in the early 20 th century). Data on municipal utilities was collected from the American Public Power Association. Assets from the municipal utility, such as service vans, customer service representatives, billing systems and buildings can be used to serve cable TV customers. These assets should reduce operating costs for a city cable TV system relative to cities that have no municipal utility. In addition, some cities that have municipal utilities also have private networks to communicate with other city agencies or fiber optic networks to monitor electricity load throughout the system. The use and servicing of these networks involves skills that should be re-deployable in the use and operation of a cable TV network. These networks could also be used as part of the physical infrastructure of a city cable TV system. I
indicate the presence of such systems with a dummy variable internal communications.
I construct three measures to capture the threat of entry from a private overbuilder. Two of these measures are based on proximity to an existing system. Proximity to their existing systems is an important determinant of entry for private overbuilders. Number of overbuilders in the DMA and the share of overbuilders in the DMA are used to proxy for the threat of entry from private overbuilders. The probability that a private company will overbuild in a given city will rise as the number (or share) of overbuilders in the area rises. I confirm this relationship in Table 4 . Column 1 of Table 4 provides Table 4 confirm that proximity is an important determinant for entry of private overbuilders. It is interesting to note that the coefficient on number of systems owned by the incumbent firm is negative and significant, indicating that a private overbuilder is less likely to enter a city and compete with an incumbent if the incumbent owns many systems in other locations. Perhaps one explanation for this result is fear of retaliation from the incumbent in other markets in which both the private overbuilder and incumbent firm already co-exist. This may be suggestive evidence that multi-market contact is an important element of private firm competition in this industry, and is an issue that will be discussed in more detail below. Prager (1990) showed that these variables were important instruments that cities could use to control incumbent cable TV firms. See Table 1 for a list of states with franchises or guidelines.
Econometric Model
My analysis focuses on the speed with which incumbent cable TV firms upgrade their systems. The main data that I use includes 16,112 system years and 3279 system
upgrades. The general form of the approach I use is twoway upgrade i (t) = f(t,Z it ) where
Z it includes the cable system, demographic and other control variables described above.
More specifically, I use a piecewise exponential hazard model to estimate the instantaneous hazard rate of system upgrade. 18 The piecewise specification allows for the hazard rate to vary across systems of different age. Hence, f(t,Z it ) = m k + Z it where m k indicates the decade in which the system was built. I also include year fixed effects and designated market area (DMA) fixed effects. The municipal utility variable does not vary with time, so a city fixed effects specification would wipe out any municipal utility effect. The DMA assignment is at a high enough level that the city level and county level 17 An underlying assumption that I have made is that DSL providers are homogenous, and so all that matters is the raw count of the number of DSL providers. Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) provide evidence that CLECs, which make up the majority of DSL providers, are heterogeneous in terms of their offerings and in terms of their entry strategies. 18 My results are robust to other specifications such as the Cox proportional hazard model. variables will not be washed out, but low enough to still control for local demographic and market characteristics not already included in my specifications.
Results

Baseline Results
Initial regression results are presented in Table 5 
Robustness Checks
The results presented in Table 5 show a significant positive correlation between two-way upgrade and the presence of municipal utility. The findings are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables and to multiple specifications. This suggests that incumbent cable TV firms use system upgrades as a way to deter city entry. This result is unique. Prior empirical tests of entry deterrence focus on private incumbent response to a private entrant, but here we see a private incumbent respond to potential entry by a public agency. Before analyzing how incumbent cable firms respond to the threat of entry from private overbuilders, we perform several robustness checks.
The significant coefficient on municipal utility might arise from omitted variables bias.
It could be that cities with municipal utilities differ in meaningful ways from cities without municipal utilities, and this difference is correlated with some other unobserved factor which is causing the incumbent to upgrade its system faster. In order to explore this possibility further, Table 6a compares observable characteristics across both types of cities. The corresponding T-statistics reveal that cities with municipal utilities differ from cities without municipal utilities. In order to correct for any bias, I use these observable characteristics to create a propensity score (p-score). Column 1 of Table 6b repeats the analysis done in Column 4 of Table 5 , but suppresses all output except for the coefficient on municipal utility. Column 2 repeats the analysis but includes the propensity score. The coefficient on municipal utility is 0.1808 and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is slightly higher than that in Column 1, and indicates that any omitted variables bias is biasing the results downward.
The designated market area (DMA) fixed effects help control for local market characteristics. However, as noted above, the DMA effect will not control for city level characteristics. City level fixed effects cannot be used because this would wash out the municipal utility effects. For some cities I do have additional information from a survey conducted by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA). The Table 6c . Column 1 of Table 6c replicates the analysis done in Column 4 of Table 5 . The coefficient on municipal utility is 0.1275 and significant at the 5% level. The fact that the value and level of significance of the coefficient are smaller is probably a reflection of the reduced sample size (2138 observations as compared to the 16,112 observations in Table 5 ).
ICMA Telecommunications in Local Government
Column 2 includes the variable right of way and Column 3 includes the variable mayor.
Neither coefficient is significant, suggesting that variation of local regulatory and political institutions is not driving the results found in Table 5 .
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As a way to further examine the robustness of the results, Table 7 introduces two new types of variation. The variable internal communications indicates municipal utilities that have some form of communications infrastructure. Cities with municipal electric utilities are expected to be able to provide cable at lower cost than cities without; cities with municipal electric utilities that also have internal communication capabilities should be able to provide cable at even lower cost. States that pass a restriction on a city's ability to build and operate a cable system act to increase the cost of such a system.
Column 1 of Table 7 repeats the analysis in Table 5 Column 4 but includes the internal communication variable. The coefficient on municipal utility is 0.1265 and significant at the 5% level; the coefficient on internal communication is 0.1386 and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that incumbent cable systems in cities with municipal utilities that have internal communications upgrade to two way capability even faster than those with only municipal utilities.
In Columns 2-9 state level variation in restrictions on the city's ability to offer its own cable service is used to further identify the effect of a municipal utility. As shown in Table 1 , some states have considered and others have actually passed laws that restrict a city from offering its own cable TV service. Columns 2 and 3 restrict the data set to smaller subsamples that only include municipal utilities (Column 2) and only those municipal utilities that have internal communications (Column 3) to test for the effect of the state restriction on cities. In Column 2, the coefficient on state restriction is -0.1143 and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that incumbents in cities with municipal utilities upgrade their cable systems slower when a restriction is in place. In Column 3, the coefficient on state restriction is -0.1949 and significant at the 5% level. This indicates that incumbents in cities with municipal utilities that have internal communications upgrade their cable systems slower when a restriction is in place.
Column 4 replicates the full model in Column 4 of Table 5 but also includes an indicator for whether or not the state has passed a restriction at time t as well as an interaction between municipal utility and restriction. The variable of interest is the interaction term, which is expected to be negative, indicating that cities with municipal utilities but that are located in restricted states pose less of a threat to the incumbent cable system than a city with a municipal utility in an unrestricted state. In Column 4, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive but insignificant. Column 5 performs the same analysis on municipal utilities with internal communications. Here, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 10% level. Column 6 tests whether this effect remains when jointly tested on municipal utility and internal communication. In Column 6 the coefficient on internal communication remains positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient on the interaction term between internal communication and restriction is negative and significant at the 5% level. Column 7 breaks out the restriction and interaction effects by year. Columns 2 to 7 provide further evidence that incumbent cable TV firms use system upgrades to deter entry by the city, but strongly suggests that this effect is driven by those municipal electric utilities with internal communications capabilities.
States that pass legislation restricting the actions of cities may differ from states that do not pass such legislation. In Columns 8 and 9, in order to control for such selection effects, I focus my analysis on states that considered or passed restrictions on cities. The assumption is that states that considered passing but did not pass (or have not yet passed) such legislation are a better control group than the entire population of states that never considered passing such legislation. Column 8 repeats the analysis performed in Column 6 but on this smaller subset of observations. In Column 8 the coefficient on internal communication remains positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient on the interaction term between internal communication and restriction is negative and significant at the 1% level. Column 9 breaks out the restriction and interaction effects by year and has similar results as presented in Column 7. Taken together, the results in Table 7 further confirm the result found in Table 5 .
Effect of Private Overbuilders
The results in Tables 5, 6 and 7 establish that incumbent cable TV firms act to deter entry by cities through cable system upgrades. Incumbent cable TV firms also face threat of entry from private overbuilders. As discussed above, Table 4 shows that private overbuilders are more likely to enter other cities in close proximity to their existing systems. Given the risk of private overbuilder entry, do incumbent cable TV firms use system upgrades to deter entry? Table 8a explores this issue using two measures of the threat of overbuilder entry. Column 1 includes all system characteristics and controls, omits the municipal utility variable, and includes a variable for the number of private overbuilders in the DMA. The coefficient on number of private overbuilders is negative but insignificant. Column 2 repeats the analysis but instead includes a variable for the share of private overbuilders in the DMA. The coefficient on share of private overbuilders is negative but insignificant. 20 Columns 3-4 repeat the analysis done in 20 Analysis was also conducted on a third measure that I used to proxy for threat of entry from a private overbuilder. Following Savage and Wirth (2005) , I regressed private overbuilder entry on a number of Columns 1-2 but includes the municipal utility variable. In all cases the coefficient on municipal utility is positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficients on both proxies for private overbuilder entry are insignificant.
The insignificant coefficient may in part be driven by heterogeneity of potential entrant type. Private overbuilders primarily consist of two types of firms: start up overbuilders such as RCN that were established in the late 1990s who aggressively pursued expansion programs and incumbent telecom firms such as Verizon who started to create video networks in the early 2000s. Of these two types of firms, the telecom firms pose a larger threat; they own physical infrastructure and may benefit from economies of scope by increasing the number of products available to their established customers. Table 8b repeats the analysis as in Table 8a , but restricts the population of private overbuilders to only include those that are telecommunication firms. 21 The coefficients on share of private telecom overbuilders are insignificant (Columns 2 and 4). The coefficient on number of private telecom overbuilders is positive and significant in Column 1, but as revealed by the drop in significance on this variable in Column 3, this result appears to be driven by private telecom overbuilders that are close to municipal utilities.
The results presented in Table 8 suggest that incumbent cable TV firms do not use upgrades as a way to deter entry by private overbuilders, and so there is no support for hypothesis 2. Of course, this does not preclude incumbents from relying on some other control variables and then used the coefficients to predict overbuilder entry for all observations. Savage and Wirth call this measure "P-Com". Similar to the other proxies used, the results for p-com are insignificant. 21 Specifically, these include BellSouth, Qwest, Sprint and Verizon [check on this].
form of entry deterrence. As noted above, the result from Table 4 show that private overbuilders are less likely to enter a city if the incumbent has many systems in other locations. Perhaps these incumbents have established a reputation for fierce competition in the face of entry and so private overbuilders choose not to enter.
Conclusion
Cities often contract with various private service providers, and often these services are provided on a franchise or monopoly basis. As suggested by Williamson (1976) , once such a monopoly is granted, the private entity may act opportunistically. Williamson documents such behavior using a case study of cable TV in Oakland. Various instruments are available to the city that help it to control agency issues that might arise.
Such instruments include an invitation to another provider to compete to offer services, vertical integration, and legal recourse. This paper demonstrates another instrument might be the ability of the city to threaten entry of itself as a competitive provider of the service. In the case of cable television, potential entry by the city acts to speed up investment in system upgrades by incumbent firms. Variation in cost of entry and operation were used to identify cities that pose a higher threat of entry to the incumbent.
While incumbents use system upgrades to deter entry by a public agency they do not appear to use system upgrades to deter entry by private firms. This heterogeneous approach to public versus private entrants can perhaps be explained by considering other forms of entry deterrence. For example, limit pricing has been shown to be an effective form of entry deterrence in other industries; maybe limit pricing is effective at deterring entry by private overbuilder cable firms. Also, as mentioned above, there is some evidence that incumbent system size deters entry by private overbuilders. This suggests that reputation or multi-market contact may be an effective deterring mechanism for private firms. One goal of future research is to better tease apart these issues. Coefficients of hazard model are presented. All results are robust and clustered at the state level. + Significant at 10%, *Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%. Coefficients of hazard model are presented. All results are robust and clustered at the state level. + Significant at 10%, *Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%. Coefficients of hazard model are presented. All results are robust and clustered at the state level. + Significant at 10%, *Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%. 
